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JUSTICE FOR INJURED WORKERS:
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES
P. BIGGIN, 0. BUONASTELLA, M. ENDICOTT,
J. MCKINNON, S. SPANO, AND D. UBLANSKY*
RtSUMt
Dans cet article, on 6tudie bri~vement le r6le qu'ontjou6 les cliniquesjuridiques
communautaires dans le mouvement des travailleurs accident6s. I1 d6crit l'6ro-
sion des principes de base de l'indemnisation des travailleurs accident6s et le
changement dans cette organisation qui met d6sormais l'accent sur la n~cessit6
de contenir les cofits au lieu d'indemniser les travailleurs, ce qui 6tait sa priorit6
traditionnelle. I1 met en lumi~re le mythe de la crise de l'endettement du regime
d'indemnisation des travailleurs accidentds et explore les effets de ce change-
ment sur les prestations des travailleurs, sur la sant6 et la s6curit6 au travail et,
ultimement, sur ]a viabilit6 d'un r6gime d'indemnisation des travailleurs acci-
dent6s sans dgard la faute et administr6 par le gouvernement. Dans cet article,
on traite 6galement des menaces pour le r6gime actuel que constituent les
propositions d'indemnisation des travailleurs de l'actuel gouvernement.
This article briefly reviews the role that community legal clinics have played in
the injured worker movement. It chronicles the erosion of the basic principles
of workers' compensation and the shift in emphasis from compensating workers
to containing costs. It exposes the myth of a debt crisis in workers' compensation
and explores the effect of this shift on workers' benefits, on workplace health
and safety, and ultimately on the viability of a no-fault, publicly-administered
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workers' compensation system. The article also outlines the threat to the existing
system in the workers' compensation proposals of the current government.
1. INTRODUCTION
(a) The Lessons of Our Past
A coalition of Toronto area community legal clinics and the Union of Injured
Workers has been active for nearly two decades in the struggle to improve our
workers' compensation system. Too many injured workers' and their families
have been exiled to poverty and despair.
Even before there was a community legal clinic system, community activists
established storefront advocacy centres to help poor communities, such as the
injured worker community, fight battles that they could not win alone. Organi-
zations like The Injured Workmen's Consultants (now Injured Workers' Con-
sultants), established in 1969 by Al Baldwin. He gained notoriety for being
lowered by rope from the public gallery to the floor of the legislature in a body
cast to dramatize the plight of injured workers. Proudly staffed by non-lawyers,
they helped injured workers take on the system.
Ten years ago, Nick McCombie chronicled the community organizing and the
legal and political struggles of the movement for justice for injured workers in
an article for the Canadian Community Law Journal.I Injured workers had just
won a long political battle against an anti-injured worker program of change
that began with the Paul Weiler studies, commissioned by the Davis govern-
ment.
2
Injured workers had forced the government to withdraw a proposal to replace
permanent disability pensions with a small lump sum for "pain and suffering"
and a reviewable monthly payment for "deemed" wage loss. And they went on
to obtain a legislative amendment to fully index their pensions to changes in the
Consumer Price Index.
(b) The Role of Community Legal Clinics
That was a time of victory. A clear example of the unique potential that
community legal clinics have to gain access to justice for our communities in
1. N. McCombie, "Justice for Injured Workers: A Community Responds to Government
'Reform"' (1984) 7 Canadian Community Law Journal 136.
2. Ontario, Reshaping Workers' Compensation for Ontario; A report submitted to the
Minister of Labour by P. Weiler (November 1980); and, Ontario, Protecting the Worker
from Disability: Challenges for the Eighties; A report submitted to the Minister of Lab-
our by P. Weiler (April 1983).
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ways that rival the methods of the powerful and wealthy special interest groups.
The imbalance of power between rich and poor in our justice system reflects
their influence on legislative agendas, on administrators, on the media and the
general public. That cannot be resolved simply by giving poor people lawyers
to do appeals when they are being evicted or their benefits cut-off.
One of the strengths of community legal clinics is that we are in a position to
identify the systemic problems affecting our communities. We have the "tools"
to help organize a broader response, based on the strength and experiences of
many for whom the system is not adequate. Case-by-case representation is
necessary, but impossible to achieve in many areas of poverty law such as
workers' compensation where the number of potential clients is enormous. Even
victory often brings too little, too late. For people living at the margins of society,
marriages break down, children grow up in poverty, and people take their own
lives, or the lives of others, while advocates squabble with bureaucrats, adjudi-
cators and judges.
Nick McCombie's article chronicles some of the effective work that was done
by injured workers and community legal clinics in all aspects of our mandate.
Education was essential; training other advocates, educating community mem-
bers and the public at large. Organizing was essential, because so many poor
people experienced the same difficulties with a system that is too big to fight
alone.
And law reform was essential, if poor people were to be entitled to the same
access to our justice system as those special interest groups with wealth and
influence. When a zoning by-law interferes with the plans of developers, or a
labour law interferes with the plans of employers, they get the law changed.
When Paul Weiler began his study of workers' compensation, he proposed to
meet with employers and unions but he did not want to meet with injured worker
groups. It was an essential part of the mandate of community legal clinics to
ensure that their communities have that opportunity as well.
(c) The More Things Change...
Now we have come full circle. In 1983, injured workers stopped the Tory
proposal to kill permanent disability pensions and replace them with "deemed
wage loss" benefits. But it was then passed by a Liberal government in 1989. A
Liberal-NDP accord legislated full indexation of injured workers' benefits for
inflation in 1985. But an NDP government took away full indexation of benefits
in 1994. These developments have been troubling for the injured worker
movement. They have raised concerns about the direction of the movement,
created internal wrangling and divisions in relations with labour organizations,
and contributed to a climate of anger and despair.
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During all this time, we heard the business community cry louder and louder
about the "W.C.B. debt crisis". In spite of major cutbacks in compensation for
permanent disability, it has become "common knowledge" that the system is
being crushed by a debt that is spiralling out of control. The new reality, we are
told, is that the debt must be eliminated and the cost of benefits capped now, or
very soon we will not have a workers' compensation system at all. And that, the
argument goes, would be bad news for employers and injured workers alike. So
let's sit down and talk rationally about the most effective way to allocate the
increasingly scarce resources in the system.
(d) Welcome to Law Reform in the '90s: Don't Question Authority
It is a universal scenario. "Economism", the economic terrorism of the '90s,
threatens our very humanity. "Of course", wizened veterans of all political
stripes say, "governments/we can no longer afford to be the element of social
change/provide the same social safety net as in the past. For the good of all
society, let's negotiate the cutbacks in a way that will cause the least harm."
Welcome to law reform in the '90s. Apparently, all programs for the "financially
or influentially challenged" are a luxury of good economic times and must now
be dissected, restructured or just plain trashed.
Unless you are prepared to question the premise. The injured worker movement
has challenged the authority of that economic premise. No one should rush to
line up at the chopping block. In our history, poor people, tenants, unions,
injured workers, and disabled people never got anything without a fight. The
more you fight, the more you get. The fact that it took so long to get where we
are reflects the dominance of the ideology that "we can't afford" to care too
much about others in our society.
(e) Another Royal Commission
The announcement of a Royal Commission into workers' compensation last year
was an opportunity for the injured worker movement to challenge economic
terrorism, to develop its position on reform of the system and to raise the profile
of their struggle. The Union of Injured Workers and the Toronto Injured Workers
Advocacy Group made a joint presentation to the Commission in the popular
style that integrates analysis with the practical experience of our community.
A special session of the Commission hearings was demanded. The twenty
minute time slots granted for presentations at the regular hearings was totally
inadequate to hear about such an enormous issue from those who bear the burden
of its shortcomings.
The hearing was held in a theatre at the Canadian National Exhibition, not in a
rented boardroom of a stuffy hotel. Unlike the public hearing which sparked the
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tradition of Injured Workers' Day, injured workers in attendance numbered in
the hundreds, not thousands. But it was probably the largest public hearing that
any Royal Commission has seen.
It was not a dry presentation by a bunch of lawyers reading briefs. The
Commission faced a hard hitting analysis of the system delivered through the
testimony of injured workers, their families, satirical street theatre, audience
participation as well as community legal workers and lawyers with a total of
more than seventy-five years of experience in injured worker advocacy.
The most significant aspect of our presentation for the direction of reform was
aimed at the "crisis" in workers' compensation. As the Minister of Education
recently advised, the most effective way to implement your agenda is to use it
to solve a crisis-even if you have to make up the part about the crisis. It should
come as no surprise to anyone that, on further analysis, the "W.C.B. debt crisis"
appears to be a hoax.
The rallying cry of the coalition of business interests that has stripped the injured
worker movement of its gains is a myth, nurtured by fear and ignorance. The
"reason" that we must face the "reality" of more cutbacks for injured workers
does not stand up to scrutiny. But in the meantime, the real crisis in workers'
compensation has remained hidden: the rising toll of deaths, diseases and
injuries in the workplace.
2. FUNDING THE SYSTEM: IS THERE A DEBT CRISIS?
(a) Why Are Injured Workers Going on Welfare?
That question was posed by the headline of an article in the Toronto Star last
fall. 3 Over the past 10 years we have witnessed a shift from basic principles of
workers compensation to cold blooded cost reduction which is undermining our
workers' compensation system. This pre-occupation with costs has driven an
erosion of the benefit scheme, bringing changes to the system that are inconsis-
tent with the basic principles of workers' compensation. It threatens to seriously
undermine the foundations and the integrity of the system.
What is most troubling about these shifts is that they have consisted of major
cuts in permanent disability compensation. In 1989, the law was changed from
a system which provided a pension for life, for life-long disabilities, to a cheaper,
time-limited wage loss system.
3. B. Livesey, "Why injured workers are going on welfare" The Toronto Star (10 October
1994) Al1.
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(b) A Shift From Concern With Disability to Cost
Recent legislative examples include Bill 165, passed in December, 1994.4 It
introduced the Friedland de-indexation formula, replacing full cost of living
indexation with less than the rate of inflation and a cap on increases. The
rationale can be understood by considering the enormous sums of money at stake
for employers. Estimates of cost savings range from $18 to $23 billion over a
20 year period. It was argued that the system could no longer afford full
indexation of benefits.
In the W.C.B. administration, we have seen changes in policy such as the recent
so called "Financial Improvements Package", released by the W.C.B. for exter-
nal consultation in January 1995.5 It contains a series of policy measures to help
eliminate the unfunded liability by the year 2014. Among the measures are:
" Shifting the cost of health care from employers onto the publicly
funded Ontario Drug Benefit Program when the worker reaches age
65, by eliminating payment for medication for compensable disabili-
ties after the injured worker turns 65 years of age.
" Reducing clothing allowance benefits for repair or replacement of
clothing damaged by braces, wheelchairs and artificial limbs.
" Eliminating the notice requirement when benefits are to be terminated.
Once a determination has been made that a worker can return to work,
no notice is required.
" Eliminating transportation allowance payments to injured workers at-
tending W.C.B rehabilitation programs or trying to find a job.
Although employers have been perpetuating the view that they are paying for
the system, data show otherwise. Workers actually pay in the form of lower
wages. Employers simply pass the costs on to the workers because the personnel
budget is limited.6 Other data show that costs are also passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices. 7
4. Bill 165, An Act to Amend the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational
Health and Safety Act, 3d Sess., 35th Leg. Ont., 1994.
5. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Financial Improvements Package (12 October
1994).
6. J. R. Chelius and J. F. Burton, "Who Actually Pays for Workers' Compensation?: The
Empirical Evidence" (November/December 1994) John Burton's Workers' Compensa-
tion Monitor at 20.
7. Ibid.
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(c) The W.C.B. Debt Crisis is a Hoax
Changes in the legislation and policy have been made that are not consistent
with the fundamental principles of workers' compensation. They have been
fuelled primarily by the "W.C.B. debt crisis", a shameless campaign that plays
on the natural fears of the public in a recession in order to gain support for the
demand to reduce injured workers' benefits.
The "W.C.B. debt crisis" is a hoax. There was never any intention of paying off
any kind of debt. In fact, there is no debt at all. So why are injured workers going
on welfare? Why is our compensation system being gutted without regard to the
fundamental principles of compensation?
The workers' compensation system is being gutted so that employers can have
even cheaper insurance than they were already getting. Every time the workers'
compensation system has been changed to pay less money out to injured
workers, employers and the W.C.B. have had the opportunity to build up larger
reserves and thereby reduce the unfunded liability without any increase in the
employers' costs. But every time the system was changed to pay less to injured
workers, they didn't use that money to pay down the unfunded liability. Em-
ployers took the money out of the system for themselves by reducing W.C.B.
premiums.
Injured workers have experienced major cutbacks in the loss of a pension for
life for life-long disabilities and the loss of automatic cost of living increases.
Employers, however, have made financial gains. Adjusted for inflation, the
average employers' premiums, published by the Ontario W.C.B., for workers'
compensation coverage have dropped about 19% over the past 6 years. 8
(d) W.C.B. Debt and Other Tall Tales
Injured workers bear the burden of the W.C.B.'s mythical debt. Business
lobbyists have secured lower W.C.B. assessment rates by spreading popular
mythology: a series of simple, believable, but wrong explanations of workers'
compensation. The myths are not just about the financing issues. We have heard
the myth of the overcompensated injured worker and the myth of the fraudulent
injured worker. We begin with the financial myths.
It's not just the uninformed or the uneducated who have accepted these myths.
They run through all segments in our society: left and right, workers and
employers. During the recent provincial election campaign, the Toronto Injured
Workers Advocacy Group and Union of Injured Workers sent a questionnaire to
each of the three main party leaders. Look at the response of Mike Harris.
8. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board: Annual Report (1994) at i.
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We asked: "Would you reduce benefit levels or services to injured workers?"
Mr. Harris answered:
"After an extensive study of the W.C.B., representatives on the Premier's
Labour-Management Advisory Committee advised the government that the
system is technically bankrupt and is in desperate need of fundamental re-
form. Bond rating services have identified the W.C.B.'s unfunded liability
as a cause for concern with respect to the province's credit rating.
My colleagues in the Ontario PC Caucus and I believe that, following the
lead of Manitoba and New Brunswick in reflecting income realities, we will
reduce benefit levels from 90 to 85% of net salary, and review the idea of
life time pension awards."9
The Premier's reply reveals that he too has been taken in by two of the most
popular myths surrounding the "W.C.B. debt crisis": the myth of the bankruptcy
of the workers' compensation system and the myth that the unfunded liability
is part of the provincial debt.
(e) The Myth of the Bankruptcy of the Workers' Compensation System
The W.C.B. is not in debt. It has never even borrowed money. For eighty years
the W.C.B. has always been able to pay injured workers with the money it
collects from Ontario employers. The W.C.B. has been able to pay its costs from
the premiums collected and still have enough left over to amass a reserve of over
$6.8 billion.
In addition, the W.C.B. just announced that it made a "profit" of $130 million
in 1994-a surplus of revenues after it paid for injured workers' related ex-
penses.' 0 That was before injured workers' benefits were stripped of full cost
of living increases at the end of 1994. Employers' average W.C.B. premiums
went down again in 1995. Imagine how low they will go next year when
employers get the full benefit of de-indexed W.C.B. payments to injured work-
ers.
(f) The Unfunded Liability: The Board's Mythical Debt
The unfunded liability is a widely misunderstood concept. It refers to the
difference between W.C.B. reserve funds (now at over $6.8 billion) and the
projected cost of all future payments to all workers now injured until the last
one dies of old age (now at about $18 billion). The unfunded liability is therefore
9. Letter from M. Harris, Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, to the
Toronto Injured Worker Advocacy Group (15 May 1995).
10. Supra, note 8, at i.
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not a debt. The $11.2 billion figure is the total of all future costs for claims on
file, minus the money in the bank.
The unfunded liability is an artificial concept because the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act l I (hereinafter, WCA) generally requires injured workers to take their
compensation in periodic monthly payments. Injured workers have no right to
go into the W.C.B. and say "I'll take it all now please, just put the cash in a bag".
So its not surprising that the W.C.B. doesn't keep it all on hand to pay out today.
A private insurance company would be in trouble if it had a large unfunded
liability. The Insurance Act requires a private insurance company to be pre-
funded. 12 Yet the W.C.B. is not in trouble. Why? Because s.102(1) of the WCA
says that the W.C.B. does not have to be pre-funded. There are good reasons for
the distinction.
The W.C.B and private insurance companies are similar since they will be
paying out compensation in the future. However, private insurance companies
have to be pre-funded because they are in competition with each other for
premiums. The problem with competition is that, next year, people might buy their
insurance from a different company, or they might not buy insurance at all. The
insurance company still has to pay claims on the policies that it sold this year.
For that reason, they have to get the money that they will need for future
payments on this year's policies out of the premiums that they collect from the
people who bought this year's policies. If they had no customers next year and
no cash reserves, they would be bankrupt and could not pay their claims.
Private insurance companies are required by law to be fully funded so they won't
go bankrupt in the event that they don't get enough business one year. That is
the problem with competition in a free enterprise system. You cannot have an
unfunded liability when you are in competition for premiums because you may
lose customers next year.
Entirely different considerations apply when the compensation system is a
monopoly. In a monopoly, there is no competition for premiums. Employers
have to buy coverage and they have to get if from the Workers' Compensation
Board of Ontario. This eliminates the dangers of people opting not to buy
coverage or opting to buy it from another source. It ensures a stable, long term
source of revenue. It is therefore possible to use the cheaper "pay-as-you-go"
or current account approach to financing the workers' compensation system.
11. R.S.O. 1990, c.W-11.
12. R.S.O. 1990, c.I-8.
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If workers' compensation is provided by a monopoly, like the Ontario W.C.B.,
and if workers' compensation coverage is mandatory, as it is for many industries
in Ontario, then the concept of the unfunded liability is irrelevant. That is why
the WCA specifically provides that the system need not be fully funded. It is
wrong and dishonest to say that the workers' compensation board is bankrupt.
(g) The Myth of the W.C.B. Liability as a Provincial Debt
The second myth reflected in Mr. Harris' reply is that the W.C.B. liability is a
part of the provincial debt. Mr. Harris notes that the W.C.B. liability is treated
like provincial debt by bond rating agencies and this is affecting the province's
credit rating.
But it is not a provincial debt. The W.C.B. has not used a cent of taxpayers'
money to cover the workers' compensation system. The system has always been
entirely funded by the employers of Ontario and has never had to borrow. Eighty
years of experience reveals absolutely no reason to fear that the W.C.B. will not
continue to be self-sufficient. No government has a track record like that.
In addition, the W.C.B. is prohibited by law from borrowing taxpayers money
to pay off the unfunded liability. Section 100 of the WCA allows the W.C.B. to
borrow money from the government to meet payments already due. For exam-
ple, to pay current monthly pension benefits due to injured workers. If it does
so, the law requires the W.C.B. to immediately recover that money by a special
assessment on employers and give it back to the Treasurer of Ontario. However,
the provision is clear that the W.C.B. cannot borrow money from the government
to pay off the unfunded liability.
So the government is legally protected and the workers' compensation board
has an unbeatable track record. If there is no legal or practical reason to fear that
the W.C.B. liability could be added to the provincial debt, why are the off-shore
bond rating agencies saying that the W.C.B. makes Ontario look like a bad credit
risk?
These "guys" are not impartial civil servants. They work for wealthy interna-
tional money market speculators who want us to pay them the highest interest
rates possible. The bond rating agencies represent speculators who would like
to make us look bad so that we have to pay them higher interest on the money
we borrow.
The G-7 "world leaders" met this spring in Halifax to find a way to reduce the
impact of international money market speculators. Their aim to profit from
speculation rather than investment in industry is costing us jobs. Governments
are forced to stabilize the value of their currency by attracting money lenders
through high interest rates, which chokes our economy.
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It is ironic that at the same time, the Premier of Ontario is suggesting that we
should cater to these speculators and restructure the financing of our W.C.B. in
a manner that will only further choke the economy of Ontario. We should not
allow monetary speculators to spook us into undermining the fundamental
principles of our workers' compensation system.
(h) The Myth of the Morality of Full Funding
In our questionnaire we also asked Mike Harris: "Would you expand workers'
compensation coverage to include all workplaces in Ontario?"
He answered:
"We are not prepared to consider any further changes until the unfunded lia-
bility is brought under control. Expanding coverage or benefits in the face
of looming bankruptcy is irresponsible, and therefore, we would impose a
moratorium on any expansion of entitlement." 13
This answer exemplifies another popular misconception about W.C.B. funding.
Mr. Harris offers the myth of a moral justification for a fully funded system. The
argument is that future employers and other employers should not be saddled
with the cost of today's injuries. It is strong on emotion but weak on practical
and economic grounds.
The practical reality is that many of today's employers successfully escape
responsibility for today's injuries. In its 1993 Annual Report, the W.C.B.
reported that about 10% of assessment revenues were lost to "doubtful ac-
counts". Interestingly, no government reform proposals have addressed such an
obvious and significant revenue leakage.
As well, an increasing proportion of injuries and diseases are the result of long
term exposure in many workplaces. W.C.B. statistics show significant increases
in the proportion of lost time claims that result from such conditions as over-
exertion and strains.14 Many of the harshest and most costly work related
diseases such as cancers, lung diseases, and chemical sensitivities are the result
of long periods of exposure or long latency periods, or both.
So the lost time claims filed this year are not just the result of the work done
this year or even the work done for the employer at the time of the claim. As
well, the changing economy in Ontario requires workers to be more flexible,
changing jobs and employers more often than ever before.
13. Supra, note 9.
14. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Statistical Supplement to the 1993 Annual Re-
port.
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(i) Full Funding Does Not Score Moral or Economic Victories
For example, a new store opens up and a few months later a cashier goes off
work with carpal tunnel syndrome. He may have spent the last five years bagging
parts for an automotive supplier that always had W.C.B. assessment rebates for
a good claims record. It may even have moved to Mexico and no longer pay
W.C.B. premiums. Perhaps he spent the last five years doing data entry for the
banks, which have never had to pay into the workers' compensation system. Are
we scoring a moral or economic victory by making sure that the store pays the
whole bill for this injury, with no contribution from the other responsible
industries?
Employers have always been saddled with the cost consequences of the work
practices of the days before. The history of the industrialized world assures us
that the workers of today are engaged in injurious work processes that are
virtually unknown to us. Even if every employer paid, up front, the full future
cost of every claim filed this year by its employees, that would completely ignore
the future cost of the injuring processes that have been set in motion this year.
So full funding means paying for injuries that are not even known. It is an
impossible task. At the very least, it would require employers to pay W.C.B.
premiums for claims that have not been filed yet. That will not be welcomed by
the employers who have already taken up the cry for a fully funded system.
(j) The Myth of Higher Premiums for Future Employers
The moral argument also appeals for inter-generational economic justice. The
argument goes that we have to try to pre-fund the system because financing the
workers' compensation system on a "pay-as-you-go" basis will push us to
economic and social collapse. The financial burden for future employers of the
cost of departed employers that did not pay the full cost of injuries from their
work will force up W.C.B. premiums so high that the remaining employers are
forced to close down, leaving the W.C.B. unable to pay injured workers.
This is the myth of higher premiums for future employers. While the injured
worker movement does not have resources to hire the actuarial experts to help
make this point, we can rely on the actuarial opinions on which employer
organizations have operated for decades.
The Canadian Manufacturers Association (C.M.A.) brought its actuarial experts
to the 1915 Royal Commission by Mr. Justice Meredith that eventually estab-
lished our workers' compensation system. To quote their actuary:
"The serious objection which can be urged against the system of current
cost assessments is that it involves a throwing on future industry of some
burdens occurring in the present. This objection is entirely outweighed by
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the consideration that the rate will not, when it reaches maximum, be
any larger than the capitalized rate, but as experience shows in Ger-
many will be much lower, and the further consideration that the immense
sums of money which it would be necessary to lay aside as a reserve
fund are left in active circulation in the employer's business. But the
theoretical objection itself vanishes when it is remembered that employers
and the community generally are now bearing and will continue for a gen-
eration to bear the burden of the accidents of the past." 1 5 [emphasis added]
The C.M.A. argued strongly for a current account or "pay-as-you-go" system
because premiums would be lower than they would be on a fully funded system.
They also saw the practical impossibility of saddling today's employers with
the complete cost of the injuries initiated today, as we described above. The
Canadian Manufacturers Association got what it wanted from the Meredith
Report in 1915. The legislation contained, and still contains a special provision
that the system need not be pre-funded.16
They warned about the immense sums of money that would have to be laid aside
in a reserve fund. In Ontario right now, $18 billion dollars would be out of
circulation if we had pre-funded our system. The W.C.B. is not investing the
more than $6 billion that it has in reserve in Ontario industries. Looking at the
1993 Annual Report, only 11.5% of reserves were invested in equities in
Canadian corporations. Less is invested in Ontario businesses and even that will
include blue chip firms that don't necessarily pay any W.C.B. premiums. Fully
funding the W.C.B. system would choke the economy of Ontario even more
today than in 1915.
Is a pay-as-you-go system still cheaper today? Does it still mean lower assess-
ment rates than a fully funded system? Yes. Take a look at the United States. In
some states, employers have the option of buying their W.C.B. type insurance
coverage from private insurance companies or from a state-run insurance
company. Where the state-run insurance companies compete with private insur-
ance companies, the state-run companies are required by law to fully fund their
system. Otherwise, they would have an unfair competitive advantage over the
private insurance industry.17
15. Ontario, Interim Report on Laws Relating to the Liability of Employers (Toronto:
King's Printer, 27 March 1912) (Commissioner: Hon. Sir William Ralph Meredith, C.
J., C. P.) at 107-111.
16. Supra, note 11, s.102(l).
17. M. Webster, The Ontario Workers' Compensation Board's Unfunded Liability: Myths
and Realities (Toronto: 1994) at 15. The study was part of the submissions to the
Standing Committee on Resources Development of the Ontario Legislature on Bill 165,
Supra, note 4, by the Toronto Injured Workers' Advocacy Group and the Union of In-
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(k) The Key to a Viable, Low Cost Compensation System
The private insurance industry would like to move in and take over the Ontario
market for workers' compensation coverage. But it cannot compete with our
workers' compensation system. We have an unbeatable cost advantage because
we have a monopoly system with mandatory coverage and therefore we can fund
the system on a pay-as-you-go basis. That is the cheapest way to fund a workers'
compensation system and the private insurance industry cannot do it that way.
If that feature of our system is destroyed, and it is certainly under attack, then
W.C.B. assessments will go up. If W.C.B. assessments go up, the private
insurance industry can step in to offer their own similarly expensive services as
a viable alternative.
There are no inter-generational advantages to full funding. This concerns the
financial bottom line. Will "pay-as-you-go" stick the next generation with a
higher bill for workers' compensation than if we pre-fund the system now? No,
the opposite is true. If we want to finance a viable workers' compensation system
on the lowest cost basis, then we must continue on a current account basis.
The key to maintaining the viability of our pay-as-you-go workers' compensa-
tion system, and to keeping rates lower than private insurance could ever do, is
to ensure that the rate groups, the assessment base of our workers' compensation
system, stay strong and healthy. There has been a shift in employment away
from the types of industry that are required to have workers' compensation
coverage. The proportion of workers in the traditional types of industry which
are listed in the schedules of the WCA as required to have coverage is shrinking.
The growth has been in the service, technical and light industries which are not
listed for mandatory workers' compensation coverage.
(1) Fighting Fire With Gasoline
Meredith himself conceded in his final report that there was no logical basis for
bringing some industries into the system and leaving some out. He judged that
there was simply not the political will at the time to overcome the resistance to
workers' compensation coverage by some sectors of the economy. Meredith
anticipated they would be brought into the system through future negotiations. 18
When Premier Mike Harris vows that he will not bring more employers into the
workers' compensation system until it is on a better financial footing, he is
putting out a fire with gasoline. We cannot imagine anything more ludicrous
jured Workers.
18. Ontario, Final Report on Laws Relating the Liability of Employers (Toronto, King's
Printer, 1913) at 9 (Commissioner: The Hon. Sir William Ralph Meredith, C.J.O.).
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than fighting a "debt crisis" by keeping out new contributors and reducing the
premiums paid by those participating in the scheme. Full coverage for all
workers and all workplaces in Ontario would insure that the W.C.B. continues
to be financially sound and continues to be the cheapest insurance possible for
employers in Ontario.
3. THE REAL CRISIS IN WORKERS COMPENSATION:
UNSAFE AND UNHEALTHY WORKPLACES
(a) A Public Health Disaster of Crisis Proportions
Every year thousands of Ontario workers are killed or injured on the job. The
exact number of injured workers is difficult to determine with precision. Al-
though W.C.B. statistics are the usual source of reference for this information,
many have argued that the actual number of workers experiencing some form
of occupational injury or disease is much greater.
A Statistics Canada survey done in 1991 found that 2/3 of adults working at a
job or business felt that they are exposed to health hazards at work. Shockingly,
1/2 of those adults exposed to health hazards reported that they have suffered
adverse health effects as a result. This means that less than 10% of workers
whose health is damaged by their working conditions actually receive
benefits from the Workers' Compensation Board.
There are a number of factors that contribute to the gap between the number of
people reporting adverse health effects and the number of lost time claims
allowed by the W.C.B. To begin, there are almost 700,00 workers in Ontario
who are excluded from coverage under the WCA. These workers are employed
in so-called "safe" industries such as banking and insurance. However, with the
introduction of new computer technology, many of these workers have suffered
repetitive strain injuries affecting their hands, wrists, shoulders and neck.
Because there is no W.C.B. coverage for these workers, the injuries suffered by
these workers are unrecorded and, in many cases, uncompensated.
Secondly, many workers suffer adverse health effects as a result of exposure to
chemical and biological agents in the workplace. There are 25,000 toxic chem-
icals used in the workplace by businesses in Ontario. Less than 700 of these are
subject to any form of regulation. The vast majority of these substances have
never been tested to determine if they cause cancer or other occupational
diseases.
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(b) Employers Do Not Acknowledge This Crisis
Very few employers take adequate precautions to protect their workers from
exposure to chemicals and biological agents. Because so little is known about
the connections between toxic substances and human health, employers in this
province are allowed to use their workers as guinea pigs in an experiment to see
if they can survive the exposure.
Even if their workers get sick or die, employers vigorously oppose any claims
for W.C.B. benefits blaming lifestyle factors such as smoking, diet or alcohol.
The onus is placed on the worker by the W.C.B. to prove that the illness is
work-related and this can be virtually impossible because of the requirement for
scientific proof of causation.
In Paul Weiler's 1983 report, Protecting the Worker from Disability: Challenges
for the Eighties, using very conservative assumptions, he estimated that the
W.C.B. was compensating less than 1 out of 17 occupational cancer deaths every
year.19 Similarly, Weiler observed that there was a significant shortfall in the
recognition of respiratory diseases as occupationally-related.
Employers in this province continue to assert that occupational disease is not a
major problem because so few claims are allowed by the W.C.B. The fact is that
employers have no idea whether the toxic substances they use are killing or
injuring the health of their workers. They don't make the effort to find out about
the toxic substances in their workplace. They don't provide their workers with
information and training on how to handle toxic substances safely. They don't
spend the money to do proper air sampling to find out the extent of worker
exposure to toxic substances or to buy the personal protective equipment to limit
worker exposure.
Finally, despite substantial research which has been done to identify sources of
stress in the workplace, employers and the W.C.B. have vehemently resisted the
pressure to provide benefits in respect of illnesses linked to occupational stress.
As a result, very few stress claims are allowed by the Board. On the other hand,
the Statistics Canada survey revealed that 37% of Canadians felt that they were
subjected to excessive stress as a result of the demands placed on them by their
jobs and poor relationships with supervisors or co-workers.
All of this points to the real crisis in workers' compensation-unsafe and
unhealthy workplaces. It is scandalous that employers have been allowed to
get away with creating the atmosphere of financial crisis around the issue of
workers' compensation without addressing the fundamental question-why are
so many workers being injured and made sick in the workplace. Surely, if
19. Supra, note 2. Using more radical assumptions would put the figure at I out of every 75.
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we could get to the answer to that question, the compensation "crisis" would be
solved.
(c) Problems With Existing Legislation and Enforcement
Employers have a responsibility under the Occupational Health and Safety Act
(hereinafter, OHSA) "to take every precaution reasonable in the circumstances
for the protection of a worker."'20 The Ministry of Labour employs approxi-
mately 250 inspectors to cover almost 120,000 workplaces in Ontario and
enforce the provisions of the OHSA. In 1992-93, inspectors made 40,000 visits
to workplaces and issued over 50,000 orders in respect of violations. 2 1 These
violations together with the 350,000 claims allowed by the W.C.B. speak for
themselves as to the commitment of employers to the health and safety of their
workers. These numbers are staggering when one considers the hysteria created
by the amount of money paid out in W.C.B. benefits. Is it any wonder that
compensation costs are skyrocketing when there is so little regard for health
and safety legislation.
We do not accept or believe that it is impossible to reduce accidents and
occupational illnesses to a manageable level. It is completely unacceptable to
suggest that it is inevitable that more than 350,000 workers will be injured or
poisoned every year in this province and that this must be tolerated as the price
of keeping business here. Surely a public health disaster that affects the well-
being of over 350,000 workers every year demands a better response than that.
It requires a bold and dynamic plan of action aimed at eradicating the root cause
of this epidemic-unsafe and unhealthy workplaces.
(d) Experience Rating is Not Effective
At present, the Board relies on its experience rating program as the vehicle for
reducing the incidence and severity of workplace injuries. Under experience
rating, the assessment rate for a firm may be higher or lower than the basic rate
for the relevant industry group, depending on the firm's individual accident
costs. It is assumed that experience rating creates a financial incentive for
employers to make investments aimed at improving unsafe working conditions.
Unfortunately, despite the theoretical attractiveness of this underlying premise,
there has been very little evidence to substantiate that experience rating has the
desired effect. The studies that have been done to test the effectiveness of
programs in Canada and the U.S. have shown conflicting results.
20. R.S.O. 1990, c.O-1, s.25(2)(h).
21. It should be noted that due to cutbacks within the Ministry, these figures are down from
previous years.
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In 1990, the W.C.B. hired Peat Marwick Stevenson and Kellogg to do a case
study aimed at assessing the impact of the New Experimental Experience Rating
(NEER) and the Council Amended Draft-7 (CAD-7) programs on the behaviour
of participating employers with respect to workplace health and safety practices.
Peat Marwick looked at 28 NEER and 7 CAD-7 participants selected by the
W.C.B. The NEER employers were selected because it was felt that they were
particularly likely to have responded positively. The reasons for selection
included recent large surcharges, continuing large surcharges and movement
from large surcharge to large surplus. It was presumed that, if these employers
were not motivated to improve their workplace conditions, then it was unlikely
that the programs had any impact on the population as a whole. On the other
hand, because these employers were hand-picked, it is virtually impossible to
conclude that positive results have much validity for employers as a whole.
The results of the study did show some modest impact on the health and safety
practices of NEER employers although factors considered were fairly common
practice among larger employers and were basic to any credible health and safety
program under the OHSA. The factors were:
1. emphasis on safety training
2. safety promotion activities
3. emphasis on personal protection
4. commitment to health and safety
It is interesting to note that the impact on the CAD-7 employers was substan-
tially less. These employers were small construction firms selected more at
random and were more "typical" of the general employer population.
The study also found that employers did not undertake any formal quantified
financial analysis of the benefits and costs of accident prevention or claims
management in the context of the incentives provided by the NEER formula. In
other words, the employers studied did not do any cost/benefit analysis to
determine the advisability of specific investments in health and safety. It was
also concluded that a significant surcharge is much more effective in promoting
a corporate response than the NEER formula itself.
On balance, it is difficult to use the Peat Marwick study as an endorsement of
experience rating for a variety of reasons.
1. The focus of the study was large unionized employers even though the
majority of accidents occur in small unorganized firms.
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2. The modifications to employer behaviour were quite modest and, for the
most part, involved activities already required under the OHSA.
3. The study found that the key factor in initiating modifications was the
creation of positions with specific responsibilities for health and safety
and claims management. Obviously, this is only possible in large compa-
nies.
4. The impact on CAD-7 employer behaviour was minimal. These are the
typical small businesses with non-union workforces where most claims
are incurred.
5. The absence of any detailed cost/benefit analysis undertaken in respect
of investments in health and safety suggest that employers are not inter-
ested in making long term financial commitments to improving working
conditions. At best, large employers may be motivated by experience rat-
ing to implement short-term, low cost, basic programs that should have
been in place long ago.
(e) Incentives to Fight Injured Workers, Not Make the Workplace Safer
Because experience rating is based on the cost of accident claims, an employer
does not necessarily have to take measures to make the workplace safer in order
to benefit from the program. In fact, the main criticism of experience rating is
that it creates a greater incentive for employers to engage in "inappropriate"
claims management activities such as dubious reporting practices, conversion
of potential lost-time claims to no lost-timers by retaining workers on payroll,
excessive resort to the Second Injury and Enhancement Fund (S.I.E.F.) and
claims appeals 22 and inappropriate on-site medical treatment. It is much easier
and cheaper to reduce the cost of claims by adopting these tactics than it is to
invest in improved technology, health and safety training and other preventative
measures.
The Peat Marwick study, discussed above, provided some support for the critics
of experience rating. Although there was modest impact on employer behaviour
in terms of health and safety, 82% of employers placed an emphasis on control-
ling claims costs by means other than safety initiatives. Claims management
techniques include:
22. B. Kralj & D. Hyatt, "Employer Appeals of Workers' Compensation Board Decisions:
The Impact of Experience Rating", in A. Ponak, ed., Teaching and Research in Indus-
trial Relations. (Proceedings of the 27th Conference of the Canadian Industrial Rela-
tions Association, 1991).
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* talking to adjudicators and raising issues, without formally contesting
the claim;
* failing to complete the Form 7 properly, so it requires special atten-
tion;
providing documentation that raises suspicions about claims;
* seeking to identify "chronic abusers" of the W.C.B. and making it
more difficult for them to receive payment of benefits;
" non-reporting of health care only claims;
" reporting short duration temporary disability as health care only
claims.
One indication that experience rating has resulted in increased emphasis on
claims management rather than safer workplaces has been the trend to longer
duration of claims even though the number of claims has been declining. Again
this suggests that health care claims are not being reported and that short-term
claims are either not reported or reported as health care only. In fact, this was
confirmed by a survey of some 1103 experience-rated employers, 20% of whom,
actually admitted that they allow their injured workers to use the short-term
disability plan rather than report injuries to the W.C.B.2 3 An additional 13.6%
of employers admitted that they encourage workers with mild or less severe
injuries to take time off with pay rather than report their injuries to the W.C.B.24
There have been some reviews of experience rating and it appears that most
observers agree that the favourable impact of experience rating on the frequency
and/or severity of accidents has not been conclusively shown. 25 The report of
the Manitoba Workers' Compensation Review Committee states:
"we heard numerous instances of how attempts were made to suppress in-
jury reporting, direct work injuries to private insurance coverage, pressure
workers to stay on the job when medical attention was clearly required, co-
erce workers back to work too soon ... [E]fforts tended toward reducing
claims cost rather than reducing injuries ... 26
23. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, Workplace Accident Reporting Practices
Study, Main Report (August 1992) at 36.
24. Ibid. at 38.
25. F. Vaillancourt, Canadian Tax Paper No. 98: The Financing of Workers' Compensa-
tion Boards in Canada, 1960-1990 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1994) at 82.
26. Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Workers' Compensation Act Legislative Review
Committee, "Report of the Workers' Compensation Review Committee" (1987) at 147.
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(f) Experience Rating Costs More Than it Brings In
All of these criticisms about the lack of positive results of experience rating
together with the negative influence it has on claims management are of more
than academic interest. Although the experience rating program is supposed to
be revenue neutral, it has not worked out that way in practice. There has been a
serious imbalance between rebates and surcharges which has contributed sig-
nificantly to the unfunded liability in the system. In 1993, $295 million was
drained out of the system to pay refunds to employers as a reward for
obeying the health and safety laws and challenging claims. For 1994, the
net loss from experience rating was $359 million.
If experience rating is not the answer to reducing the incidence of occupational
injury and disease, then what is? As stated above, we do not accept that injuries
and disease in the workplace cannot be reduced to manageable levels. The belief
that high levels of accident frequency are inevitable is not tenable or acceptable.
There are employers who take safety seriously and the results speak for them-
selves. It can be done if the will is there to make it happen.
(g) Employer Commitment to Safety is Necessary
The recent study commissioned by Liberty International Canada, Unfolding
Change: Workers' Compensation in Canada, cites several spectacular examples
of dramatic improvements in safety performance by corporations that have
committed to safety and imbedded this commitment into the working culture of
the organization.27 These examples provide support for the work being done by
the Institute for Work and Health around the issue of occupational lower back
pain which is described in the Liberty International Study. Relying on evidence
that total occupational injury rates are related to workplace organizational
practices, researchers at the Institute have suggested that it is likely that the same
relationship exists with respect to back injuries since they constitute the largest
single injury category.
These developments point the finger of responsibility directly at employers.
Employers control the work environment and they are in a position to make
the organizational and technological changes that need to be made in order
to reduce the number and severity of work injuries and illnesses. What is
required is senior management commitment to safety and a plan of action
to make the commitment a reality in the workplace. As the Liberty Interna-
tional study points out, if the level of lost-time claims costs in Canada could be
reduced to a level just ten times higher than that of the leading performer among
27. Liberty International Canada, Unfolding Change: Workers' Compensation in Canada
(Toronto, 1995) 5 Volumes.
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chemical manufacturers, the reduction in costs would eliminate the unfunded
liability and eventually lead to a reduction of employer assessment rates.
The compensation system must be designed to encourage employers to accept
responsibility for improving their health and safety performance. This could be
done in a number of ways, and they are discussed below.
4. REFORMING HEALTH AND SAFETY
(a) Integration of Workers' Compensation and Health and Safety
Because of the connections between health and safety in the workplace and the
number of occupational injuries and illnesses that result from unsafe working
conditions, there is an obvious need to combine jurisdiction over these issues in
the W.C.B. There are too many agencies, boards and government departments
operating in the field. The duplication of effort, whether it be in research,
education or enforcement leads to inefficiencies and much higher administrative
costs. It also contributes to the lack of focus on prevention which currently exists
within the W.C.B.
Combining responsibility for health and safety enforcement with workers'
compensation provides a unique opportunity to take dead aim at poor perform-
ers. Once systems are in place to identify workplaces that are unsafe, a W.C.B.
with overall authority to deal with all aspects of the situation will have the tools
necessary to make changes that are needed. In addition, the knowledge that the
means exist to root out these performers will provide a real deterrent effect that
does not exist at present. The Ministry of Labour simply does not have the
resources to inspect all workplaces and employers know it. On the other hand,
the W.C.B. is much more visible to employers and constitutes a real threat to
those employers that ignore health and safety.
(b) Workplace Audits
Because of the criticism of experience rating, there was pressure on the W.C.B.
to look beyond frequency or claims costs as a basis for surcharges and rebates.
As a result, the Workwell program was introduced in 1987. The criteria used for
the Workwell audit focuses on health and safety programs and determines
whether they have written standards and procedures, formal training, commit-
ment of senior management, written accident investigation procedures and
workplace inspections.
Although the Workwell program itself probably concentrates too much on a
paper exercise, the idea of basing rates on actual audits or inspections of working
conditions has merit and should be pursued. A real health and safety audit that
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inspects working conditions, monitors exposures, scrutinizes the design of
workplaces, and the choice of equipment and materials for health and safety
purposes is far more likely to promote prevention.
(c) Employer Education
One of the problems with experience rating is that it focuses attention on a
relatively minor component of the cost of occupational injury and disease
incurred by employers. Studies done have estimated the cost of injury and
disease at anywhere from 4-20 times the compensation cost. The hidden costs
include damage to material and equipment caused by the accident, lost produc-
tion and time lost by other employees responding to the accident. These hidden
costs provide a far greater potential incentive than compensation costs for
employers to minimize the incidence of accidents.
Employers need to be educated to view the issue of prevention from a total cost
perspective and to be made aware of the impact that good occupational health
and safety practices have on the overall profitability of the enterprise indepen-
dently of their impact on compensation costs. The Liberty International study
notes that the University of Toronto is currently carrying out a research project
which will attempt to demonstrate that there is a link between world class safety
and good business performance.
(d) Enforcement of Health and Safety Legislation
Health and safety consciousness is virtually non-existent in the unorganized
sector. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Labour's level of enforcement activity in
the unorganized sector is also virtually non-existent. That situation has to change
if there is to be any meaningful improvement in working conditions in Ontario.
The lack of health and safety commitment among small employers is clearly
reflected in the injury frequency rates compiled by the W.C.B.
As noted above, better enforcement of health and safety standards would be
greatly facilitated by a merger of jurisdictions between the W.C.B. and the
Ministry of Labour. However, this does not obviate the need to develop a specific
plan of action to focus on unorganized workplaces. Everyone knows there is a
problem there but, as yet, there has never been the political will to attack the
problem head on.
(e) Reduce Injuries, Not Workers' Compensation
It is time to stop paying lip service to the notion that prevention is the only real
solution to controlling the cost of workers' compensation. If employers are
unhappy about the high cost of W.C.B. claims, then they must address the
need to design workplaces that don't injure people or make them sick. If
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they are unwilling to do that then they must pay the full price of the pain
and suffering created as a result. There cannot be a trade-off of workers' health
for business profits.
Any effort to deal with the financial problems facing the W.C.B. must recognize
that full compensation of injured workers is a principle of the system that is not
negotiable. As Paul Weiler said in Reshaping Workers' Compensation for
Ontario:
"It is illegitimate in principle to argue that the Workers' Compensation
Board must tighten up on claims and cut back on benefits because its total
budget is growing too large, too fast, for the economy to afford. This should
be as unthinkable as would be a suggestion to the Chief Justice that the
number and level of tort awards be restrained by his judges because insur-
ance premiums are getting too high. In both cases, the same answer is ap-
propriate: the only proper means of containing the bill for accident losses is
to reduce the number of accidents themselves."'28
Simply put the only truly legitimate way to reduce the cost of the workers'
compensation system is to reduce the number of occupational injuries and
diseases. Better health and safety practices mean fewer workplace injuries and
diseases, less down time, less lost production, less loss of man-hours, less repair
costs etc. Reduce injuries, not compensation.
5. REFORMING THE W.C.B. ADMINISTRATION
(a) What is the Purpose of Our Workers' Compensation System?
The purpose for which the system was to serve employers still holds true.
Employers are still protected from lawsuits by their employees in the courts.
They can still calculate compensation as a cost of doing business, although this
is being undermined by activities of employers themselves by their demand for
experience rating and by challenging individual claims.
The fundamental purpose of the system, to provide injured workers with
"speedy justice, humanely rendered", 29 has been utterly lost. Injured workers
are experiencing unconscionable delays in the adjudication of their benefits. For
example, the W.C.B. cut a man off his benefits two years ago because they
thought he was expecting a baby. Even though the error was pointed out more
than six months ago, they haven't paid him yet. Workers, especially those with
28. Supra, note 2, at 15-16.
29. Official motto of the W.C.B.
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non-visible injuries, are treated with suspicion. Many people find that the
W.C.B. does not believe them.
(b) Harassment of Injured Workers
Injured workers suffer arbitrary benefit cuts without consultation or warning.
They go to the bank and find that the direct deposit from the Board has not been
made. Two or three weeks later they may receive a cursory letter of explanation
from the W.C.B. Many people, at some time, have been cut off their benefits
without warning, even though they still had a disability and no job.
On top of problems with the W.C.B., injured workers are experiencing what can
easily be termed outright harassment by their employers in their claims. Increas-
ingly, employers are challenging every aspect of a claim and resorting to the use
of high paid consultants and private investigators to steer their challenges. While
the W.C.B. will defend injured workers from the most blatant of these intrusions,
the system is generally encouraging this kind of behaviour through both admin-
istrative measures and financial rewards.
(c) W.C.B. Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry
We have represented injured workers for many years and have seen a dramatic
shift in the way they are treated by the W.C.B. There have always been
complaints about the administration of claims. However in the past, bumbling
as the W.C.B. was, there was a certain integrity. When a mistake was acknowl-
edged, it moved swiftly to rectify it. Now a mistake is simply re-worded to put
up a new roadblock in the claim. Or else a new reason to deny benefits is quickly
found.
In the past injured workers were recognized as people who had to put food on
the table and pay rent. Attempts were made to smooth over transitions in
benefits. No such attempts are made now, except where experienced represen-
tatives manage to discuss matters with experienced W.C.B. staff.
We have all seen this trend to move rapidly, ever further, from the fundamental
purpose of the system: to seek to compensate injured workers justly and speedily
for their injuries.
(d) Some Simple Administrative Solutions
In the first place, the W.C.B. must be understood by its staff as the body which
is charged with implementing the Act in the best interests of injured workers.
Leadership, policy development, and decision making must be carried out by a
staff dedicated to this purpose. There are W.C.B. documents from the past that
put this concept forward. For example:
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"Every employee of the Board is a public servant. Public service requires a
spirit of dedication.
As dedicated public servants it is our duty to:
1. Be sure in all cases that every injured worker who is entitled to the ben-
efits of the Act shall receive as expeditiously as possible the full remunera-
tion provided by the Act and the best available medical and rehabilitation
services ... .30
The ability to handle claims well would be greatly enhanced if claims adjudica-
tors were given low caseloads which they could maintain for the life of the claim.
The claims adjudicator must be seen as one of the most important staff functions
at the W.C.B. The claims adjudicator must have the knowledge, discretion and
mandate to seek to assist the injured worker.
At present, adjudicators are poorly trained, severely overburdened, and given
neither time nor mandate to conduct a reasonable inquiry into a claim or properly
consider its merits if the conclusion is not obvious at first sight. They are forced
to be over reliant on W.C.B. doctor opinions and/or to deny a claim for ludicrous
reasons which can take a worker months or even years to rectify through the
appeal system.
(e) Make the Correct Decision in the First Place
At present a tremendous number of the cases which are clogging up the appeal
system represent nothing more than poor initial decision making, ranging from
decisions based on incomplete information to a lack of familiarity with the Act
or policy. This represents an additional cost to the system which can easily be
eliminated if the adjudication is done properly in the first place.
There are three major roadblocks to a system committed to "speedy justice,
humanely rendered." The increasingly adversarial nature of claims, the intrusion
of financial concerns into claims adjudication, and the narrowing focus on a
"stakeholder" concept of policy development.
(f) Fundamental Principles Are Undermined by An Increasingly
Adversarial System
When William Meredith crafted the Workers' Compensation system in 1915, he
specifically established an inquiry system, which was to remove confrontation,
30. Ontario Workers' Compensation Board, A Statement of Basic Policy of the Workmen's
Compensation Board in its Administration of the Workman's Compensation Act, Board
of Directors Minutes (7 December 1964).
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as a cornerstone of the plan. This was to both allow for speedy payments to
injured workers and to reduce costs for employers. Meredith proposed a simple,
non-adversarial system in which the Workers' Compensation Board had the
mandate to enquire into and decide all matters needed to determine the compen-
sation payable. The system involved the board and the injured worker.
In fact Meredith opposed introducing an appeal system. In that stage of the
development of the principles of administrative law, an appeal system involved
an appeal to the courts. This is what Mr. Justice Meredith had to say about an
appeal system:
"A compensation law should in my opinion, render it impossible for a
wealthy employer to harass an employee by compelling him to litigate his
claim ... once he has established it to the satisfaction of a board such as that
which is to be constituted ...,,.31
(g) Employer Involvement in Claims Must Be Limited
In our experience, we have now achieved the opposite. We have a system with
such strong financial incentives to harass an injured worker that an employer
does not even have to be wealthy to tie a claim up in years of litigation. There
is a growth industry of private consultants who exist, like parasites, on the
workers' compensation system. They fight claims on behalf of employers at no
cost up front, instead taking a share of the proceeds from experience rating
rebates and second injury and enhance fund relief.
We used to see only the occasional employer turn up at a worker's appeal,
usually a federal government (Schedule II) employer who pays directly for the
claim. Now we find an employer at most workers' appeals and we find them
initiating their own appeals. The legalistic Workers' Compensation Appeals
Tribunal developed appeal structures which invited employer participation and
employers have responded with their own interest, heightened by the experience
rating system which came in at about the same time.
In our experience, none of the employer appeals or submissions at workers'
appeals have anything to do with actual disagreement over the justice of the
individual claim. They have to do entirely with trying to get rebates from the
W.C.B.
Employer involvement hampers the W.C.B.'s ability to do its job properly. It
creates anxiety, insecurity and anger amongst injured workers who should be
allowed to concentrate on medical, vocational, emotional and social recovery.
Employers should not be allowed to do this. The rational choice for an inquiry
31. Supra, note 18, at 12.
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system was made a long time ago. We are convinced that we must return to that
function for the system to operate efficiently as was intended.
There are only two points at which an employer should be involved in a claim.
At the point of initial adjudication, providing the necessary information which
can dispute or support the workers claim. And at the point of return to work, if
the employer is offering employment. Otherwise there should be no involve-
ment. Specifically:
1. Employers should not have access to the worker's claim file.
2. Employers should not have the right to request that the worker undergo a
medical examination under their direction.
3. Employers should not receive notice about appeals and developments in
a worker's case, especially with "cost statements" attached; and
4. Employers should not have the right to be part of the appeal process.
In order for this to occur, the system must be set up such that an employer has
no financial interest in an individual claim. This means abolishing the experi-
ence rating system and returning to collective liability.
(h) The Cash Register Approach to Adjudication
Employers may have legitimate concerns about their competitive edge in our
free-trade world. The W.C.B. may have legitimate concerns about its eroding
financial base as Ontario loses its industrial base and coverage is not extended
to the emerging economic sectors. But these concerns have no place in the
adjudication of claims.
The W.C.B. has allowed a cost hysteria to permeate at all levels-right down to
the individual claim. Cost control is replacing common sense, policy and the
Act itself in the adjudication of individual claims. Claims adjudicators, rehabil-
itation caseworkers, hearings officers-all claims decision makers, have gotten
the message to "keep costs in mind," as they render their decisions. We see the
results every day as injured workers come to us with truncated claims.
Perhaps the most notorious example of this was the massive termination of
supplements under s.147(4) of the WCA which took place last winter. These
supplements are to be recalculated based on the worker's actual income situation
on two occasions. Last winter thousands of injured workers came up for their
second and final recalculation. The W.C.B. used the occasion to actually cut-off
about 30% of supplements generally, claiming that the workers should not have
received them in the first place.
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The reason was obvious. Receipt of these supplements is the eligibility criteria
for the additional $200 per month provided in Bill 165 which was passed in
December, 1994. Terminating a $380 a month supplement saved the Board $580
a month under the new legislation. Eventually the W.C.B. and Ministry of
Labour acknowledged that the cut-offs were contrary to the Act and the supple-
ments are slowly being reinstated. This "mistake" would never have been made
if cost cutting had not become a key adjudicative principle.
It would be in the best interests of an effective system which seeks to do justice
for injured workers to clearly separate the adjudicative functions of the Board
from the revenue concerns.
(i) The "Stakeholder" Concept Entrenches Conflict in the W.C.B.
The complete acceptance of the adversarial aspect of the system, and the
complete lack of identification of the injured worker as the person for whom the
system is meant to serve, is reflected in the bi-partite structure of the W.C.B.'s
Board of Directors, that resulted from Bill 165, which splits the seats between
representatives of labour and employers. It does not give any seats to injured
workers in their own right, nominated from their own organizations.
The stakeholder concept is a dubious one to run the Board. The two sides are
too fundamentally in opposition to each other to allow the Board to function. It
has been paralysed. Ask anyone who works at the W.C.B. for details of how this
affects their work. In order to overcome the paralysis there will be an attempt
by some to forget the fundamental principles of the system and to resort to
bargaining. It will be difficult to resist trading off issues for each side in order
to get something, anything done.
The stakeholder concept tends to exclude the input of those who are not formally
at the table. For example, we requested a meeting with top executives of the
W.C.B. to discuss some concerns. We were informed that these executives were
already planning a meeting with representatives of organized labour and busi-
ness on the same subject. Therefore it was not necessary to meet with us. We
would be informed of the outcome of the meeting. Injured workers and their
advocates have never had less meaningful contact with W.C.B. officials than in
these years of "stakeholder" consultation.
The W.C.B. should be run by people with a commitment to the system of
workers' compensation and a fundamental understanding of what that system is
meant to accomplish. It should be run by people who understand the needs of
injured workers and can translate this into administrative action. A recommen-
dation in this regard was made to re-institute the former practice of involving
Board members in the appeal system. Participation in appeals provided admin-
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istrators the opportunity for tremendous insight into the workings of the W.C.B.,
the nature of policies, and the practical problems faced by injured workers.
6. REFORM OF THE BENEFIT STRUCTURE
(a) Does the System Measure-Up to Basic Principles?
The recent Royal Commission into Workers' Compensation was the fifth.
Following the Meredith Commission and report in 1915, we had the Middleton
Commission in 1932, the Roach Commission in 1952 and the McGilvary
Commission in 1967. Almost every Royal Commission Report begins with the
observation that the public has a large misconception of the principles on which
workers' compensation is based.
We approach the problem of what is wrong with workers' compensation by
comparing what we see in our day to day experience with the fundamental principles
of workers' compensation. These are the principles which guided the scheme
proposed by Mr. Justice Meredith in 1915 and which we believe are still valid today.
We begin with the principle of the "historic compromise", a term given to
describe the original social contract between workers and employers that gave
rise to the workers' compensation system. Working people gave up their right
to sue their employer in the courts for compensation for work place injuries in
exchange for a no-fault, employer paid, state administered system of compen-
sation for work related injuries and diseases.
The term "historic compromise" is often used rhetorically, like "justice", and
"fairness". However, it is a fundamental principle that is not without content
and application in assessing the workers' compensation system of today. From
the historic compromise, it can be seen that workers' compensation is a substi-
tute for a legal right. It follows, therefore, that workers' compensation must be
viewed as a right of workers in Ontario. It is not a discretionary system of charity,
paid only as long as convenient or affordable to an employer. Workers' compen-
sation is not spare change for injured workers.
(b) It May Be Better Than a Kick In The Pants, But...
In the courts, where the right to sue originates, the ability of the defendant to
pay is irrelevant to the issue of the liability of the defendant and it is irrelevant
to the amount of damages awarded. As well, in the courts there has been a
tremendous liberalization in the principles of liability and the level of damages
awarded as compensation over the past 80 years.
Workers' compensation, and any changes to the workers' compensation system
must be measured against the historic compromise. Workers' compensation
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must be assessed in comparison to the present day value of the right to sue. The
question must be asked: Can the system still be considered a fair exchange for
giving up the workers' common law right to sue the employer for damages?
Many fail to appreciate this important principle. For example, consider the
recent announcement by the Minister of Labour that she will introduce a Bill to
reduce workers' compensation benefit levels and to limit entitlement to exclude
compensation for some stress and other work related disabilities. 3 2
(c) Workers' Compensation Is A Right, Not A Luxury
That kind of cutback proposal reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the
workers' compensation system. Workers' compensation is a right, not a luxury
of good economic times. The system provides a substantial benefit to employers
who receive protection against multi-million dollar law suits by workers killed
and injured on the job. The day that benefits are not payable under the WCA for
a work related disability is the day that injured workers are free to take their
employers to court. The protection in s. 10(9) against civil actions will not apply.
Employers will face huge lawsuits and will soon have to buy disability insurance
while they are still paying for W.C.B. coverage.
The system must measure up to the principles in the "historic compromise". No
government should tinker with the workers' compensation system when it lacks
a good understanding of the basic principles on which it is based.
(d) Fundamental Principles for Permanent Disability Compensation
On the topic of 'full compensation', Mr. Justice Meredith had this to say:
"a just compensation law ... ought to provide that the compensation should
continue to be paid as long as the disability caused by the accident lasts,
and the amount of compensation should have relation to the earning power
of the workman." 33
"Job security or full compensation" has been a fundamental principle in the
platform of the Union of Injured Workers for the past 20 years. Full compensa-
tion, in our view, is full compensation in the Meredith sense. A pension for life,
for life-long disabilities.
On the subject of temporary compensation, Mr. Justice Meredith had this to say:
32. Letter from Elizabeth Witmer, Minister of Labour to the employer and worker commu-
nities inviting submissions into proposals for reforming workers' compensation (28 Au-
gust 1995).
33. Supra, note 18, at 13.
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"to limit the period during which compensation is to be paid regardless of the
duration of the disability, as is done by the laws of some countries, is, in my
opinion, not only inconsistent with the principle upon which a true compensa-
tion law is based, but unjust to the injured workman for ... he will be left ...
without any earning power at a time when his need of receiving compensation
will presumably be greater than at the time he was injured ... ".34
(e) A Move From Permanent to Temporary Compensation
There has been a movement away from compensation for permanent disability
and toward temporary compensation and under-compensation of permanent
disabilities. This is not consistent with a basic principle that ought to underlie
our system.
Injured workers should be the main focus of the workers' compensation system.
The permanently disabled are the "key sector" of injured workers. The reasons
are obvious: The system must take care of the most serious and permanent
injuries and diseases.
We represent an important group of permanently disabled injured workers-the
injured workers from the Metro Toronto region and surrounding communities.
We are the ones who fought in the early '70s for pension supplements to increase
low pensions. We fought for full cost of living increases in the '70s and '80s.
We are the ones who had 5,000 angry voices at the public hearing in 1983 to
stop the attempt to take away pensions. The ones who had to storm the Ontario
legislature in order to get the simplest thing-public hearings on Bill 162. The
ones who fought and stopped the Copeland administration's attempt to take
away the pension supplements that belong to the older injured workers.
(f) Permanently Injured Workers Are the Most Alienated
The permanently disabled represent the most angry and alienated part of the
compensation system. They were good before the injury. They had a future. But
after the injury, they went from a somebody to a nobody-a claim number-a
burden to employers and a burden to government. How quickly others forgot
their contribution to society.
If a country considered its wounded soldiers a burden and forgot them, we would
call it uncaring and uncivilized. Injured workers did not go to war, but are the
"peaceful soldiers"-those who built the subways, factories, offices and apart-
ment buildings and were injured permanently working in them. To treat this
group as a burden, as if they were disposable, is also a sign of an uncivilized
society.
34. Ibid. at 13.
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(g) How to Properly Compensate Permanent Disabilities
The number one issue that has dominated the compensation debate for the last
20 years has been the issue of pension reform. To put it another way, how to
properly compensate permanent disabilities. Today there is an artificial division
between injured workers with a permanent disability. Those who were injured
before 1990, who have the right to a pension for as long as their disability lasts.
And those injured after 1989, who can be "deemed " to have a job even if they
don't and who, in no case, will be compensated for their lost earning capacity
after they reach 65 years of age.
Consider the reasons that injured workers and their advocates opposed the new
"wage-loss" system, and preferred to keep the old pension system and improve
on it. Permanent disability affects a worker all day, forever. We wanted to
preserve the simple and fundamental principle that there should be a pension
for life for life-long disability. It is not only related to the loss in wages, but
affects the person in family life, social life, even during sleeping hours. We were
offended by the suggestion that compensation should cease at 65 years of age.
As if an amputated arm would magically grow back on the 65th birthday.
There is a myth of the overcompensated pensioner. We rejected the notion that a
person who returned to work at no wage-loss with a permanent disability should
not receive a pension. Suppose your right arm is amputated but you can still do your
job. In the name of common sense and simple justice, should you not have some
compensation for life since you will be without an arm for the rest of your life?
As for economic loss, how long does it take you to do the same tasks as before?
Will you get a promotion as easily as before? What about the loss of the ability
to work overtime, or to change to a higher paying line of work? What about the
money you will spend hiring people to do the work around the house you could
do before?
(h) The Problem With Wage-Loss Systems
Deeming is a disaster. We knew that to move from a pension for life system to
a wage loss system would involve the infamous practice of "deeming." We knew
that we were not going to get a real wage loss system, as promised by then
Labour Minister Greg Sorbara, but a phony wage loss system based on phantom
jobs, not real wage losses.
During the pension reform debate of the last 20 years we also knew that
"deeming" was a problem that could not be fixed. The experience of all the
wage-loss jurisdictions in Canada and the United States is unequivocal. If you
move away from pensions to a wage-loss system you will get "deeming", which
is the opposite of what people think of as wage loss compensation.
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They are inseparable. The experience of Ontario is illuminating. We got "deem-
ing" in 1990 with the Liberals. The NDP took over in September of 1990 with
an express promise by the Premier to "move swiftly to eliminate deeming". A
joint labour-management committee was set up to deal with it. But deeming is
still alive and doing very well. We must return to a system that awards pensions
for life for life-long disability.
(i) The Importance of Security
A pension system offers permanently disabled injured workers more security.
Even if the pension is low and inadequate (and it need not be so), the worker
knows that it lasts for as long as the disability lasts. It's secure. It will come
every month. And it can increase if the condition gets worse, as is often the case
with weight bearing joints.
With the 'deemed' wage loss system injured workers know that they are never
going to be secure. You will be reviewed by the Board. Chances are, if you got
a future economic loss award, it will be reduced, not increased. The W.C.B. says
the job they deemed you capable of doing two years ago would provide you with
even higher wages now. So they will reduce your compensation accordingly,
even if you are not working. Or it will use an increasing area of the province to find
an imaginary job for you. First it's the local job market, after 2 years it's the regional
job market, after 5 years it's the whole province. There are job opportunities
somewhere in Ontario and if you don't have a good job, that's your problem.
There is nothing that injured workers want more than freedom from W.C.B.
harassment. A pension allows that freedom. If your benefits depend on your
"cooperation" with the Board, its like being in jail. The Compensation Board is the
jailor, the injured worker the Prisoner. That's how injured workers who have to
"cooperate" with the Board see it. We know people who panic every time the
phone rings in the house. It could be the W.C.B. caseworker, or the adjudicator.
They panic every time the post office delivers a letter. "Is the Board cutting me
off?" they fear.
Whatever you do or say may be interpreted the wrong way-and the W.C.B.
will cut your benefits. If you say you feel bad, they can say you claim total
disability. So you are not cooperating: "Stop the payments!". If you say you feel
good, they may say you don't need any help: "Stop the payments!". If they offer
a job, you feel you just have to take it, even if you know it will make you worse.
If you don't take it-"Stop the payments!". If your doctor advises one thing and
the W.C.B. says something different, you're caught in the middle again. And if
you choose your own doctor, its "Stop the payments!".
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No matter what you do, they may find an excuse to stop those payments
tomorrow. It's a system of constant fear and insecurity. The "wage loss" system
has been described by Professor Terry Ison as a "sentence of perpetual proba-
tion". 35 He defends the pension system as a vastly superior system.
(j) The Effect on Vocational Rehabilitation
The pension system maximizes vocational rehabilitation. The "deemed" wage
loss system interferes with rehabilitation. If you have a pension, any job you
find will provide earnings that you can add to your pension. With a so called
wage loss system, good rehabilitation means less compensation. If you get
retrained for a good job, its bad for you because your compensation will be based
on the earnings of this job, whether you are able to get it or not.
The worker is put between a rock and a hard place once again. Do you go for
good rehabilitation or decent compensation? The two should never be in con-
flict. It is not an accident that vocational rehabilitation has deteriorated since
1990. As Professor Ison predicted, vocational rehabilitation has become a
system of policing injured workers, a system of "directed labour" with a
"paramilitary flavour". 36 Strong words from a mild-mannered law professor and
former chair of the Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia.
(k) An Improved Pension for Life
While rejecting the wage loss system, there were nevertheless some weaknesses
with the pension system. It was too "orthopaedic", in that it recognized the most
evident injuries like amputations, but failed to recognize soft tissue injuries,
chronic pain and other less obvious yet debilitating conditions. It did not
recognize back disabilities sufficiently. The British Columbia W.C.B. increased
the percentages for back disabilities in the 1970's to address this inadequacy.
In response to the Weiler studies, the Association of Injured Workers' Groups
proposed a "third option". A pension system that would award a pension for non
occupational loss and a pension for occupational loss. 37 We continue to endorse
that proposal. Alternatively, it is also possible to "fix" the old pension system
with adequate pension supplements.
35. Ontario, Re: Workers' Compensation in Ontario. A Commentary on the Report Enti-
tled: "Reshaping Workers' Compensation for Ontario" by Paul C. Weiler A report
submitted to the Minister of Labour by T. Ison (February 1981) at 16.
36. Ibid. at 20.
37. The Association of Injured Workers' Groups, Our Proposals for Property Reshaping
Workers' Compensation for Ontario (Toronto, June 1983).
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8. ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
We did not address the Royal Commission's mandate regarding alternative
compensation systems including the issue of universal disability and accident
insurance. The Toronto Injured Workers' Advocacy Group and Union of Injured
Workers have had many discussions on these topics. We recently had a one day
forum to discuss the pros and cons of universal disability and accident insurance.
One of the few things that was clear to all of us by the end of our forum is that
universal disability and accident insurance is a very long term project. It is very
important to us and to injured workers that we move quickly to fix the system
that we have now. We would support the establishment of a one-person Royal
Commission solely for the purpose of studying universal disability and accident
insurance. We believe that this is a concept that needs an architect, rather than
a committee, to design. A Royal Commission on this issue should have the
mandate to design a model system.
We cannot express an opinion on the concept of universal disability and accident
insurance when there is no concrete proposal on the table. The concept has
proven to mean too many different things to different people. In any abstract
discussion about pros and cons, it is more likely than not that people discussing
it have different systems in mind. We had hoped the Royal Commission would
concentrate on improving the workers' compensation system that we have now.
9. THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES
Ontario's new government moved swiftly to disband the Royal Commission
before it could report on what it heard in six months of public hearings. It will
not be so easy to kill injured workers' program for reform that developed during
that time. Unfortunately for injured workers, there is certainly a plan to do so.
The program of the new government for W.C.B. reform includes: 38
1. Reduce benefit levels to 85% from 90%.
2. Review the idea of a life-time pension award.
3. Introduce an unpaid three day waiting period for claims.
4. Reduce the Future Economic Loss Awards by 15-40%.
5. Redefine "accident" to require more proof of work relatedness.
6. Put a freeze on new entitlements such as "stress" and limit stress claims
to those that result from a traumatic event.
38. Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, Workers' Compensation: Common Sense. For
a Change (Toronto, 1995).
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7. Privatization-examine contracting out for both the administration and
provision of services such as rehabilitation.
8. Take immediate action to address fraud and abuse of the system.
9. Entrench financial accountability in the WCA's purpose clause.
10. Improve the experience rating system to reward employers with lower
premiums.
11. Cut employers' premiums by 5%, saving Ontario employers an estimated
$98.5 million.
Injured workers have never faced such a comprehensive attack from any
government in the 80 year history of our workers' compensation system. If
implemented, these changes will destroy the system for injured workers and
employers as well. Although the government's proposals are based on myths,
misunderstandings and ignorance, the struggle for justice for injured workers is
going to require all the "tools" at the disposal of our legal clinics and our
communities.

